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Abstract 
 
This article considers the rights of those displaced by armed conflict to their property and 
to return home under general international law in light of Demopoulos and its impact on 
subsequent cases. The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the case as 
inadmissible on the ground that the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) established 
by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was an effective domestic remedy which 
should have been exhausted first. Significantly, the Court concluded that the lapse of 
significant time and the political nature of a dispute should influence its decision whilst 
property restitution is not the only available remedy to those displaced. This article takes 
a critical stance on these conclusions. In doing so it emphasises the significance of 
property restitution and to return home and argues that the decision, as evident from post-
Demopoulos developments, fundamentally undermines the established rights of the 
displaced giving primacy to political realism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Forcible displacement because of armed conflict continues to constitute a human rights 
problem of significant proportions.
1
 Such civilian uprooting has serious implications for 
the displaced population. Displacement in this context is associated with deprivation of 
fundamental rights including the rights to property and to home and freedom of 
movement and settlement in one’s own country. It may also amount to a war crime and a 
crime against humanity under certain circumstances.
2
 Hence, displaced persons, 
irrespective of whether they have crossed an international border, require the effective 
protection of international law.  
This article critically assesses the conclusions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Demopoulos.
3
 Indeed, the decision raises broader questions relating to 
the rights of the displaced affected by armed conflict and foreign occupation, particularly 
their right to property and to return home.
4
 With continuing conflict worldwide, it is 
essential to see how contemporary international law responds to such challenges and 
what safeguards are in place for their protection. It is also important to see how the 
                                                 
1
 Recent statistics estimate those displaced irrespective of cause at 27 million, excluding refugees. United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘On the Run in Their Own Land’, available at: 
www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html [last accessed 31 March 2014]. 
2
 On consequences of displacement see The Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, The 
State of the World’s Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) at 155-56. 
3
 Demopoulos and others v Turkey (2010); 50 EHRR SE14 at [9]. For critical review Loucaides, ‘Is the 
European Court of Human Rights Still a Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?’, 
(2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law at 435-465; Polyviou and Arakelian, Fall of the Guardians: 
The European Court of Human Rights and the Case of Demopoulos (Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, 
2011). 
4
 This article does not consider those displaced due to natural disasters. 
 3 
ECtHR approached these challenges, and how the rights of the displaced have been 
affected as a result of the court’s conclusions. 
Demopoulos concerned a claim brought by Greek-Cypriots against Turkey for 
violation of peaceful enjoyment of their property safeguarded under article 1 Protocol 1 
(P1-1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). They also complained of 
violation of their right to home protected under article 8 ECHR. According to the 
applicants, such violations resulted from Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus since 1974. The 
ECtHR dismissed the applications on the ground that the applicants had not exhausted the 
domestic remedies provided under ‘law 67/2005’ adopted by the self-declared ‘Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC).5 Under this law, individuals should refer their 
claims to the ‘Immovable Property Commission’ (IPC).  
Whilst Demopoulos continues to recognise Turkey as responsible for the situation 
in Cyprus, which remains a problem of occupation,
6
 it prevents Greek-Cypriots from 
resorting to the ECtHR and denies them the right to restitution and to return home. In 
theory, displaced Greek-Cypriots could still turn - and indeed some have turned
7
 - to the 
ECtHR after having exhausted the remedy under consideration. Is however such remedy 
truly effective as the ECtHR concluded? This article challenges this and argues that the 
decision in Demopoulos has serious legal repercussions on the exercise as well as on the 
substance of the rights of the displaced.   
This article examines Demopoulos in light of the international legal framework 
relating to the protection of displaced persons. It takes a critical stance on the ECtHR’s 
conclusions and argues that the rights of the displaced to property and to return home are 
well-rooted under human rights and humanitarian law and the law on state responsibility. 
It challenges the ECtHR’s references to political realism and it analyses the reasons that 
make the remedy before the IPC ineffective. This is further achieved by reference to 
subsequent judicial developments such as Meleagrou and to information obtained by 
individuals who have resorted to the IPC for a remedy. The discussion then focuses on 
states which did not put in place extensive restitution programmes and nevertheless 
achieved peace, with analysis of the reasons why Cyprus needs to be differentiated from 
these. The article finally concludes that property restitution and the right to return home 
are essential requirements for the restoration of the international legal order, human rights 
and the rule of law. 
The analysis starts with a brief background of the leading cases relating to the 
Cyprus conflict. Such enquiry is essential in order to comprehend the legal context of 
Demopoulos. 
 
2. The Cyprus–Turkey Conflict before the European Court of Human Rights 
 
On 22 July 1989, Titina Loizidou, a displaced Greek-Cypriot, lodged a complaint against 
Turkey before the European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) for violation, 
among others, of P1-1. Loizidou complained that as a result of the Turkish occupation of 
                                                 
5
 Demopoulos, supra n 3; ‘Law for the compensation, exchange and restitution of immovable properties 
which are within the scope of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution, as 
amended by Law nos. 59/2006 and 85/2007’.  
6
 Demopoulos, ibid, at [114].  
7
 I.e. Meleagrou et al v Turkey Application No 14434/09, Decision, 2 April 2013. 
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Cyprus she had been prevented from peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.
8
 The case 
was referred to the ECtHR which held that Turkey was solely responsible for TRNC acts 
and that the violations had a continuing character. Mindful of the fact that the ECHR 
must not be read in isolation of other rules of international law, including those 
prohibiting armed force, the ECtHR concluded that the applicant had not validly lost title 
over her property.
9
  It further found that Turkey’s acts constituted a total and continuous 
denial of access and purported expropriation without compensation. This was in breach 
of P1-1.
10
  
         The ECtHR, taking into consideration the TRNC’s unlawful character, refused to 
‘attribute legal validity’ to provisions interfering with property rights. Nevertheless, it 
considered it neither desirable nor necessary ‘to elaborate a general theory concerning the 
lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the “TRNC”.’11  
The judgment in Loizidou is significant in many respects, particularly relating to the 
responsibility of occupying forces for human rights violations in territories under their 
control. Even more so, it constitutes a landmark decision in ECtHR jurisprudence on the 
property rights of the displaced. The extent to which, however, later rulings are consistent 
with the conclusions in Loizidou is discussed below.  
Importantly however, Loizidou opened the way to more individual applications. It 
was followed by Demades where the ECtHR concluded that Turkey’s actions infringed 
not only the applicant’s right to property, but also his right to have access to and use his 
home. Furthermore, the ECtHR refused to consider whether the Law on Compensation 
for Immovable Properties Located within the Boundaries of the TRNC adopted by 
Turkey in 2003 constituted an effective domestic remedy. This was because it was given 
effect after the hearing on admissibility.
12
 
Turkey’s attempt to prevent further applications reaching the ECtHR, however, did 
not come as a surprise. This was particularly so after the conclusion in Cyprus v Turkey 
that remedies of de facto authorities such as the TRNC could be regarded as domestic 
remedies, in deviation from Loizidou. Yet again, the ECtHR concluded that due to 
property restrictions imposed by the TRNC Constitution resort to its courts did not 
provide an effective remedy.
13
  
Challenged by the wave of similar claims, the ECtHR took a further step of limiting 
individual access in Xenides-Arestis.
14
 According to its ruling, ‘the Court cannot ignore 
the fact that there are already approximately 1,400 property cases pending before the 
court brought primarily by Greek-Cypriots against Turkey.’15  Having initially concluded 
that the remedy under the 2003 law is not effective,
16
 it called on Turkey to introduce a 
remedy ‘which secures genuinely effective redress for the Convention violations’ in this 
                                                 
8
 Loizidou v Turkey  (1997); 23 EHRR 513. 
9
 Ibid, at [43] and [46]. On TRNC illegality see United Nations SC Res 541, 18 November 1983, 
S/RES/541 (1983) and SC Res 550, 11 May 1984, S/RES/544 (1983) (1984).  
10
 Loizidou, ibid, at [63]; Cyprus v Turkey (2002); 35 EHRR 30 at [187].  
11
 Loizidou, ibid, at [44] – [45].  
12
 Demades v Turkey Application No 16219/90, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 31 July 2003 at [20].  
13
 Cyprus v Turkey, supra n 10 at [184].  
14
 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey (2011); 52 EHRR 16.  
15
 Ibid, at [38]. 
16
 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey Application No 46347/99, Admissibility, 14 March 2005. 
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and similar cases.
17
 It did so by reference to article 46 ECHR which requires compliance 
with the Court’s judgments. Whilst stressing that states parties are free to choose the 
means by which they will comply with their obligations, the court conditioned this on the 
compatibility of such means with its conclusions in these judgments.
18
 In view of this, it 
ordered postponement of all similar claims until such remedy was introduced.
19
  
Following this, Turkey adopted the Law for the Compensation, Exchange and 
Restitution of Immovable Properties (law 67/2005) by which it established the IPC. The 
role of the IPC is to consider Greek-Cypriot property claims. However, in deciding the 
question of just satisfaction in Xenides-Aresti, the ECtHR rejected Turkey’s claim that 
the applicant should, at that stage of the proceedings and after it had made a judgment on 
the merits, resort to the IPC.
20
 Nevertheless, the Court welcomed the steps taken by 
Turkey. 
In exercising its functions the IPC is empowered to decide the applicable means of 
redress in each instance, namely restitution, exchange of properties or compensation. A 
right of appeal is further provided before the TRNC High Administrative Court. The 
extent, however, to which this process satisfies international legal standards, including 
effectiveness, falls at the centre of the analysis that follows. 
It is within this context that Demopoulos should be understood. In deciding that the 
IPC procedure was effective, the court declared the applications as inadmissible for 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Importantly, Demopoulos deviates from established 
ECtHR jurisprudence on the impact of unlawful occupation on the rights of legitimate 
property owners. It undermines the significance of restitution in the Cyprus context in an 
arbitrary manner
21
 and it unjustifiably qualifies the right of the displaced to return home. 
In doing so, it closes the door to international justice even to those who do turn to the 
IPC, as the recent inadmissibility decision in Meleagrou demonstrates.
22
 This latest 
judicial development is illuminating as to why the findings in Demopoulos need to be re-
visited to re-instate procedural and substantive justice and the rule of law.
23
   
Before however turning to an in-depth discussion of Demopoulos and its impact on 
the rights of the displaced in Cyprus, it is first necessary to see what conclusions can be 
drawn from other transitional cases before the ECtHR concerning property-related rights. 
 
3. Transitional justice and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the rights of the dispossessed 
 
Whilst the ECHR does not incorporate a right to acquire property, the peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions is safeguarded under P1-1. This protects against arbitrary deprivation 
except in the public interest and in accordance with the law and the general principles of 
international law.  However, as evident from the non-retroactive character of the ECHR 
and its Protocols, this provision was not intended to remedy past injustices such as for 
                                                 
17
 Xenides-Arestis, supra n 14 at [40].  
18 Ibid, at [39] 
19
 Ibid, at [50]. 
20
 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey (2007); 44 EHRR SE13 at [37]. 
21
 Contrast Demopoulos and Meleagrou with Dzhurayev v Russia (2013); 57 EHRR 22 at [248]. 
22
 Supra n 7. 
23
 Brems and Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 176 at 186. 
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instance deprivation of property that occurred during World War II (WWII).
24
 This by 
itself casts doubt as to the ECHR’s role in achieving transitional justice.25  
To this effect, P1-1 is construed in a way that furthers states’ economic and social 
agendas and amidst a lack of consensus on social and economic rights.
26
  
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on property-related matters reveals two main 
judicial trends. The first places the emphasis on the continuing rights of the initial owner 
and on strengthening the rule of law by rectifying past injustices.
27
  The second trend 
places the emphasis on the rights of the current owner as imperative for economic 
stability, particularly for third parties who acquired such property in good faith.
28
 Justice, 
according to this view, is achieved through the establishment of institutions such as the 
ECtHR which is sufficient to prevent repetition of the violations and to bring ‘closure.’29 
In both situations, the rule of law is understood to be satisfied in conflicting ways.  
The ECtHR, in an effort to retain the status quo and economic stability, has 
generally rejected on jurisdictional grounds claims concerning property that was taken 
during anomalous situations.
30
 Examples are those that emerged during communist 
regimes and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  
The judgment in Blecic is quite revealing.
31
 The applicant was a Croatian citizen 
living in Zadar whose specially protected tenancy was terminated because her flat 
remained unoccupied for longer than six months.  The decision was based on laws 
adopted at the time aimed at preventing the return of people from other ethnicities such as 
in this instance. The courts did not accept war as justification for such absence.
32
 The 
ECtHR rejected the case on lack of temporal jurisdiction. Emphasis was placed on the 
time of the interference and not the time of refusal to provide a remedy to that 
interference.
33
 Blecic was deprived of her property with the Supreme Court’s decision of 
February 1996 and before Croatia’s ratification of the ECHR in 1997. With the Supreme 
Court’s decision the deprivation became res judicata. As the ECtHR questionably 
concluded, deprivation – as opposed to interference with peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions - was an instantaneous act and not of a continuing character.
34
   
In the German cases brought after reunification the ECtHR was also reluctant to 
recognise the initial owner’s property rights where expropriation materialized before 
ratification of Protocol 1. Whilst property restitution was the primary objective of 
                                                 
24
 Allen, ‘Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights’, (2006-07) 13 
Columbia Journal of European Law 1 at 8-9. 
25
 Ibid, at 8; Macklem, ‘Rybna 9, Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International Human Rights Law’, 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 1 at 23. 
26
 Allen, ibid, at 8-9.  
27
 Ibid, at 5-6.   
28
 Allen and Douglas, ‘Closing the Door on Restitution: the European Court of Human Rights’, in Buyse 
and Hamilton (eds), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 208 at 210. 
29
 Ibid, at 212. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Blecic v Croatia (2006); 43 EHRR 48. 
32
 Lamont, ‘Confronting the Consequences of Authoritarianism and Conflict: The ECHR and Transition 
Rights’, in Buyse and Hamilton, supra n 28 81 at 89.  
33
 Blecic, supra n 31 at [77], [79] and [81].  
34
 Ibid, at [85] and [86]; Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European human rights 
perspective, with a case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mortsel (Antwerpen): Intersentia, 2008) at 240. 
 7 
reunification,
35
 it was precluded for property expropriated during the period of Soviet 
occupation (1945-49).
36
 The different treatment was challenged before German courts 
and the ECtHR.
37
 Both courts concluded that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
held no responsibility for property-related violations committed either by the former 
Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
38
 Moreover, in Weidlich and 
others the ECommHR dismissed the case as inadmissible as the expropriations were 
carried out before the entry into force of the ECHR.
39
 However, whilst the ECtHR could 
not examine questions of liability for the pre-unification expropriations, it considered 
whether the applicants had a legitimate expectation as a result of the 1990 Joint 
Declaration.
40
 It held that the German government enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation 
in relation to indemnification and restitution for violations carried out by another 
power.
41
  
The German cases, as also explained in Section 9, need to be distinguished from the 
Greek-Cypriot cases before the ECtHR. This is because the German expropriations took 
place well before the coming into force of the ECHR whereas the interferences with 
Greek-Cypriot property occurred after the adoption of the ECHR and have a continuing 
character.
42
 Significantly however, in the latter cases Turkey, as a foreign occupying 
power, is accountable for such interferences, whereas the FRG was not since it had no 
control over the territory and acts under consideration. Turkey’s acts in relation to the 
property of the displaced are tantamount to theft,
43
 which makes restitution an imperative 
objective.  
Whilst the ECtHR has been reluctant to invalidate expropriations as seen in the 
cases above, Loizidou signified a major turning point. It stood as an exception whereby 
the ECtHR held that the fact that the applicant had been denied access to her property 
was an aggravating factor.
44
 Significantly, the unlawful character of the denial of access 
to property and the fact that the title to the property had not been lost led the ECtHR to 
                                                 
35
 Article 41, Treaty of 31 August 1990 between the FRG and the GDR on the establishment of German 
Unity (Unification Treaty); article 1, Treaty of 18 May 1990 between the FRG and the GDR on the 
Creation of an Economic, Currency and Social Union; Law on the Regulation of Open Property Issues of 
23 September 1990; ‘Restitution before compensation’. German History in Documents and Images, Vol. 
10: One Germany in Europe, 1989-2009, available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter3_Doc_1English.pdf [last accessed 31 March 2014]; Heslop and Roberto, ‘Property 
Rights in the Unified Germany: a Constitutional, Comparative and International Legal Perspective’, (1993) 
11 Boston University International Law Journal 243 at 259. 
36
 Joint Declaration on the Settlement of Open Property Questions, June 15, 1990; Jahn and others v 
Germany (2006); 42 EHRR 49. 
37
 Judgment, April 23, 1991, 1 BvR 1170/90; 1 BvR 1174/90; 1 BvR 1175/90. Also Heslop and Roberto, 
supra n 35 at 264-66; Buxbaum, ‘The von Maltzan Case: Property Rights after Three Generations’, in 
Berger et al (eds), Zivil- und Wirtschaftsrecht im Europaischen und Globalen Kontext Private and 
Commercial Law in a European and Global Context (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2006) at 295. 
38
 Weidlich et al v Germany (1996); 22 EHRR CD55; Von Maltzan and others v Germany (2006); 42 
EHRR SE11 at [111]. 
39
 Weidlich et al, ibid.  
40
 Joint Declaration, supra n 36. 
41
 Von Maltzan and others, supra n 38 at [111].  
42
 Loucaides, ‘The Protection of the Right to Property in Occupied Territories’, (2004) 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 677 at 688; Allen, supra n 24 at 24. 
43
 See Heslop and Roberto, supra n 35 at 267-268. 
44
 Allen, supra n 24 at 14, 15-6, 18-9 and 22.  
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conclude that the violation was of a continuing character.
45
 In this regard, the Greek-
Cypriot cases up to Demopoulos were the ‘only set of cases’ where the ECtHR refused to 
recognise a ‘law’ that gave effect to the taking of property.46  
In narrowly construing international rules relating to temporal jurisdiction in 
transitional cases, the ECtHR refused to accept that the effects of discriminatory 
restitution laws had a continuing character, an approach followed by the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC).
47
 In particular, the HRC held that confiscation of private property or 
failure to provide restitution or compensation on discriminatory grounds breached article 
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
48
 
By dismissing property claims on grounds of inadmissibility or lack of jurisdiction 
the ECtHR prevents access of victims to justice.
49
 Arguably, its fundamental role in 
protecting human rights and establishing a European public order could justify deviation 
from strict adherence to temporal jurisdiction.
50
  
In trying to understand why the ECtHR has taken this approach, Judge Jambrek’s 
dissenting opinion in Loizidou may shed some light. According to him, the ECtHR is not 
the forum where cases relating to transitional justice may be settled. For him, courts ‘are 
ill-equipped to deal with large-scale and complex issues which as a rule call for 
normative action and legal reform.’51  
An examination of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on property claims in transitional 
cases therefore reveals lack of clarity, refusal to give due consideration to the 
circumstances under which the property was lost, but also concern over retaining stability 
and the status quo.
52
 As discussed above, the ECtHR accepts that property rights which 
have long been extinguished cannot be revived and on the basis of lack of jurisdiction it 
rejects them. As noted, ‘it is clear that there is doubt that the “ordinary” principles of 
justice and human rights are relevant in the transitional context’ and that ‘the resolution 
of old disputes is not within [the Court’s] domain.’53  
Demopoulos, in clear deviation from Loizidou is another confirmation of the 
ECtHR’s unwillingness to deal with massive and widespread human rights violations. 
The next section sets out the findings of the ECtHR and the legal basis on which it relied 
for its decision. This is followed by a critical analysis of the court’s conclusions as well 
as an assessment of the reasons why, in the author’s view, Demopoulos sets a significant 
setback to the rights of the displaced. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Ibid, at 17. 
46
 Ibid, at 13.  
47
 Established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS, 171 and 1057 
UNTS, 407.  
48
 I.e. Simunek, Hastings, Tuzilova and Prochazka v The Czech Republic (516/1992) 
CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995), [11.6]. 
49
 Allen and Douglas, supra n 28. 
50
 Ibid, at 230.   
51
 Loizidou, supra n 8; Allen, supra n 24.  
52
 Allen and Douglas, supra n 28 at 227 and 232. 
53
  Ibid, at 220. 
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4. The Findings in Demopoulos 
 
The main argument of the parties in Demopoulos was whether the remedy under the IPC 
should have first been used before resort to the ECtHR. On the one hand, Turkey argued 
that a finding in support of the legal validity and effectiveness of such remedy was 
inescapable, as this was set up in compliance with the decision in Xenides-Aresti.
54
 On 
the other hand, the applicants challenged the legal basis and competence of the IPC to 
provide effective remedies.
55
  
The ECtHR dismissed the applications for failure to exhaust the available remedies, 
a rule well established in international law and further stipulated in article 35 ECHR. This 
provision aims to entrust domestic courts with the main responsibility over human rights 
complaints allowing only a subsidiary and complementary role to the ECtHR.
56
 The court 
does not aim to assume the role of national authorities which are better placed to know 
the facts and to take action to redress a violation.
57
 States should also be allowed the 
opportunity to correct the wrongfulness of their acts. This enables only those cases which 
cannot be adequately resolved domestically to be considered at the European level. The 
significance of the rule is evident due to the practical difficulties the ECtHR is 
experiencing in addressing all individual complaints before it. This is particularly true 
today with its expanded territorial jurisdiction which has overburdened an already under-
resourced court.
58
 These practical difficulties are central in the ECtHR’s conclusions in 
Demopoulos according to which 
 
The Court cannot emphasise enough that it is not a court of first instance; it does not have the 
capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large 
numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary 
compensation
59
. 
 
Similarly, the court rejected the applicants’ claim that pilot judgments should not extend 
to the Cypriot property cases because Turkey had failed to comply with previous 
rulings.
60
 This procedure aims to identify persistent systemic problems of serious human 
rights violations and their source. It enables states to strengthen their internal mechanisms 
and, in doing so, to limit the number of cases that reach Strasbourg such as in 
Demopoulos.
61
 In this particular instance, the ECtHR concluded that the procedure is not 
                                                 
54
 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [55].  
55
 Ibid, at [58]-[62].  
56
 Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’, (2008) 19 No. 1 European Journal of International Law 
125 at 128. 
57
 Ibid, at 142. 
58
 Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalism of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’, 
(2009) 9 No. 3 Human Rights Law Review 397 at 401 and 406. 
59
 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [69].  
60
 Ibid, at [81].  
61
 The procedure deals with systemic widespread serious human rights violations. Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers, Judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem, 12 May 2004, Resolution 
(2004) 3, available at: https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743257&Site=COE [last accessed: 
31March 2014]; Sadurski, supra n 58 at 414; Helfer, supra n 56 at 142.  
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conditional upon the state’s conduct. Rather, what seemed to be important was the 
consideration of ‘a series of repetitive or clone cases’.62  
Disassociating the question of remedies from the question of recognition, the 
ECtHR stressed that the existence of illegal occupation does not render all acts of a de 
facto authority invalid.
63
 Relying on the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia,
 64
 it held that Turkey was responsible for TRNC acts and that it was 
obliged to take steps to comply with its ECHR obligations in northern Cyprus. To this 
effect the ECtHR felt compelled to accept the validity of civil, administrative or criminal 
law measures.
65
 Concerned not to create a vacuum for those within or outside the 
jurisdiction of an occupying power and whose rights are affected, the ECtHR emphasised 
that ‘allowing the respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to 
an indirect legitimisation of a regime unlawful under international law.’66 This further led 
the ECtHR to conclude that the remedy introduced by Turkey was sufficient to eliminate 
the administrative practice complained of by the applicants.
67
  
Concluding that the IPC was a domestic remedy and that the rule of exhaustion 
applied, the ECtHR then turned to the applicants’ complaint that the IPC was not an 
effective remedy as restitution was not safeguarded. Here the ECtHR makes a number of 
conclusions which in the author’s view raise significant legal questions.  
First, taking into consideration that over the course of the years property had often 
changed hands the ECtHR pointed out that ‘The issue arises to what extent the notion of 
legal title, and the expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is realistic in 
practice.’68 Significantly, recognizing that the state has wide discretion as to what 
measures it will implement to comply with its ECHR obligations, the ECtHR concluded 
that the form of remedy is determined by the strength of the connection between legal 
title and possession and that in effect the passage of time severed this relationship.
69
 
Moreover, property is ‘a material commodity’ which can be compensated or exchanged. 
Whilst acknowledging that the ECHR could not be interpreted in isolation of other rules 
of general international law, the ECtHR stressed that it was primarily a human rights 
body. Subsequent to this, individual applications ‘cannot be used as a vehicle for the 
vindication of sovereign rights or findings of breaches of international law between 
Contracting States.’70 Importantly, the ECtHR concluded that it would be ‘arbitrary and 
injudicious’ to demand restitution, ‘even with the aim of vindicating the rights of victims 
of violations of the Convention’,71 where to do this would involve the eviction of men, 
women and children. 
Finally, whilst recognizing that the procedure before the IPC did not incorporate 
claims relating to violations of the right to home, the ECtHR concluded that such 
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violation could be covered as part of non-pecuniary damages. This was so despite the fact 
that in order to submit a claim before the IPC it was necessary to hold title, leaving 
unprotected other categories of persons whose right to home had been infringed.
72
  
Having considered the findings and legal justifications of the ECtHR in 
Demopoulos, it is now time to critically assess some of the main conclusions of the court 
which in the author’s view contradict legal principles and have an adverse impact on the 
rights of the displaced as protected under general international law.  
 
5. The Impact of Political Considerations and Time on the Rights of the Displaced  
 
Displaced persons are frequently caught in prolonged unsuccessful political negotiations 
leaving them in a legal limbo. What are their rights then if, due to ongoing disagreement, 
there is no prospect for a speedy resolution? Do the political nature of a dispute and the 
passage of time have, or should they have, any impact on human rights determinations? 
This section considers these issues in the light of Demopoulos and the ECtHR’s 
references to the plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem (Annan plan).
73
 Whilst the 
latter will not be discussed in detail some reference is relevant. This is to the extent that it 
demonstrates how political considerations may have influenced in this instance legal 
outcomes in relation to the fundamental rights of the displaced.  
It is true that the Cyprus dispute has been on the agenda of international fora for 
more than five decades. As a result of the continuing division of the island the Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriot communities have been prevented from enjoying a common peaceful 
European future based on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. 
International players such as the UN and the Council of Europe feel that it is time to find 
a long-lasting settlement to the dispute which remains in its current form an anomaly in 
the international legal system. It is perhaps with these considerations in mind that the 
ECtHR referred to the prolonged negotiations and the political nature of the dispute with 
its practical consequences on all those affected by it. 
Nevertheless, inter-communal discussions cannot be used as justification for ECHR 
violations.
74
 This is even more so since the Annan plan never came into force as a result 
of the Greek-Cypriots’ exercise of their right to self-determination.75  
Importantly, the Annan plan was widely perceived as not effectively safeguarding 
fundamental rights including the rights to property and home and freedom of movement 
and settlement.
76
 For instance, only up to 18% of those displaced would be able to return 
in a period of 19 years after the plan’s adoption.77 The plan imposed permanent and 
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discriminatory restrictions on such rights on the basis of racial and ethnic considerations. 
It did not significantly differ from the constitutional arrangements introduced in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and which were found by the ECtHR to be in violation of human 
rights.
78
 Moreover, it concretised demographic alteration by allowing a large number of 
illegal Turkish settlers to remain in Cyprus. Such settlements impinge on the right to 
property and to return home and are in violation of article 49 (6) of the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention - by which Turkey is legally bound - and customary international 
law.
79
 The prohibition of population transfers by an occupying power is absolute and not 
subject to any exceptions such as military necessity.
80
 Moreover, transfers constitute 
grave breaches and war crimes under article 85 (4) and (5) of Additional Protocol I 
(although this has not been signed by Turkey) and under article 8 of the Rome Statute.
81
  
In this regard, any settlement must adhere to the fundamental rights and democratic 
principles on which the Council of Europe is founded.
82
 Territorial acquisition through 
aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as ethnic cleansing and 
displacement on discriminatory grounds, should not be recognised.
83
  
Most worryingly, the ECtHR influenced by the political realities on the ground 
seems to submit to such realities at the expense of human rights and the rule of law.
84
 In 
its own admission,  
 
the Court finds itself faced with cases burdened with a political, historical and 
factual complexity flowing from a problem that should have been resolved by 
all parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political 
level. This reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution 
of the broader political dispute must inform the Court's interpretation and 
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application of the Convention which cannot, if it is to be coherent and 
meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances.
85
   
 
There are two main issues that emanate from this passage and which will be considered 
in turn. These relate to the relevance of political and factual realities for the resolution of 
human rights violations and the passage of time.  
Whilst the political nature of the Cyprus problem is undisputed, it is also undisputed 
that it remains firstly a problem that is subjected to international human rights and 
humanitarian law. The UN Charter itself stipulates the obligation to settle international 
disputes in compliance with principles of justice and international law.
86
 The realpolitik 
which the ECtHR refers to provides an excuse to be exempted from law.
87
 This is 
contrary to the rules on state responsibility which dictate cessation of the wrongdoing, 
restitution, and, when this is not possible, compensation for any loss incurred. As noted, 
there is a ‘need to prevent the completed wrong or the continuing wrong ... from 
surviving through its consequences.’88 This is closely related to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice’s (PCIJ) pronouncement according to which ‘reparation must, as far 
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.’89 The 
ICJ for its part has stressed that the political nature of a dispute did not prevent it from 
focusing on its legal aspects.
90
 Accordingly, the political character of the situation in 
Cyprus does not bring it outside the realm of law. Importantly, the enjoyment of rights is 
not conditioned on the non-political nature of the dispute. By contrast, international 
human rights law protects the individual from arbitrary state action in all circumstances. 
As a consequence, no state action can be exempted from such legal scrutiny. 
Nor is the submission that fundamental rights, including the rights to property and 
home, can be erased with the lapse of time in accordance with international law. As 
rightly pointed out, ‘Allowing the time factor to weigh against the claimant in such a case 
would result in the legitimization of the State's arbitrary or discriminatory refusal to allow 
the entry of the individual to his or her “own country”.’91 Veraart agrees and challenges 
the position that the passage of time erodes legal claims, particularly in the case of 
flagrant violations of international law.
92
 Property restitution for instance, irrespective of 
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the lapse of time, has symbolic value as restoration of the legal order itself. As noted, 
‘finding a legal response to extreme injustice would be always a meaningful project, 
irrespective of the passage of time.’93 Hence, such restitution is necessary to undo the 
unjust enrichment.
94
 Indeed, ‘No healing is possible without reconciliation, and no 
reconciliation is possible without justice, and no justice is possible without some form of 
genuine restitution.’95  
Dealing with past injustices and protecting effectively human rights (and restoring 
them) is an essential component of any peace process.
96
 Accordingly, the ECtHR’s 
conclusion that ‘with the passage of time the holding of a title may be emptied of any 
practical consequences’97 finds no support in international law. Both The Hague 
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit expropriation of property during 
armed conflict unconditionally, a matter discussed below.
98
 The passage of time is 
therefore neither sufficient to take away the illegality of the act nor to remove the title 
concerned. Nor does it entitle the wrongdoing state to choose the form of remedy to be 
provided.
99
 Questions also arise regarding the ECtHR’s conclusion that the link between 
one of the applicants in Demopoulos with her home had been broken. The fact that the 
applicant was only two years old when she abandoned her home should not be sufficient 
to deprive her of the protection of article 8 ECHR. In this regard, neither a wrongful act 
nor time can break the legal bond that individuals have with their home.
100
  
Furthermore, the passage of time does not eliminate the wrongfulness of the act or 
the state’s responsibility for an act it has ceased committing.101  Even more so, the 
passage of time has no relevance when the violation is continuing.
102
  
It can therefore be concluded that the rights of the displaced relating to their 
property and home cannot be compromised as a result of political or factual realities or 
the passage of time. Nor can a state benefit from its wrongdoing, a principle well 
established in international law.
103
 To the contrary, it is in these circumstances that the 
ECtHR is called on to ensure cessation of the violation and to safeguard the rights of the 
dispossessed against state abuse. In the light of this analysis, the next section considers 
the procedure before the IPC. To what extent should individuals be expected to exhaust 
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such remedy and be subjected to the procedure of pilot judgments? The analysis that 
follows demonstrates the reasons why the remedy in question is not effective as required 
under articles 13 and 35 ECHR and as set out in Akdivar.
104
  
 
6. The Immovable Property Commission as an Effective Remedy? 
  
A. Legal Nature and Effects of the Immovable Property Commission 
 
One of the controversial issues in Demopoulos is the conclusion that the IPC provides an 
effective remedy.
105
 Is, however, a remedy effective when it is the product of a violation 
of human rights, the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law?
106
 The acquisition of 
territory through force constitutes a violation of a peremptory norm, and as such states 
have an obligation not to recognise the wrongful act or its consequences.
107
 Whilst the 
ECtHR refused to consider sovereign issues or breaches of international law, such 
determination was essential for deciding the effectiveness of the remedy before it.
108
 This 
is because the ECHR must not be read in a vacuum but in harmony with other rules of 
international law.
109
  
Despite this, the ECtHR concluded that  
 
It can hardly be expected, for evident practical reasons, that the “TRNC” 
authorities themselves proceed to pronounce the legal and administrative 
system in the occupied areas to be null and void in order to satisfy the points 
of principle raised by the applicants and intervening Government.
110
  
 
Yet, fundamental normative principles cannot be compromised in favour of practicalities. 
        As noted earlier, the ECtHR relied on Namibia which accepted as domestic 
remedies deeds of an unlawful de facto organ.
111
 The ECtHR was indeed anxious not to 
create a ‘legal vacuum’ for those affected by foreign occupation and to enable them to 
seek protection of their fundamental rights.
112
 Truly, it is important that these rights are 
fully protected particularly during conflict.  The Opinion on Namibia aimed to protect 
legal transactions and arrangements made to the benefit of inhabitants of occupied 
territory.
113
 However, whilst the ECtHR in Demopoulos was keen to recognize IPC acts, 
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in its later inadmissibility decision in Meleagrou it accepted as valid the IPC’s refusal to 
recognize the transfer of property lawfully carried out by the authorities of the Republic 
of Cyprus. This issue is considered in Section 8. 
Significantly, in this instance it is doubtful whether resort to the IPC which aims to 
further the status quo of occupation adequately safeguards the rights of those the ECtHR 
wished to protect.
114
 In situations of a continuing violation of international law, the 
emphasis should be on the cessation of the wrongful act. Unless such cessation occurs 
and restoration of rights is completed, any remedy provided will be just an attempt to 
legitimize an illegal regime. The ECtHR interpreted Namibia ‘solely from the standpoint 
of the Convention’115 as opposed to general international rules which require non-
recognition of unlawful acts. 
Contrary to the ECtHR’s conclusions, not all remedies which aim to advantage the 
individual would be effective. In this regard, the ECtHR broadened the scope of the  
‘Namibia principle’ on the basis of ‘logical necessity’ and having read the Opinion ‘in 
conjunction with the pleadings and the explanations given by some of that court’s 
members.’116 This interpretation is not justified by the relevant passage of the Opinion 
itself.
117
 The Opinion should be therefore narrowly construed to include only deeds of the 
nature mentioned by the ICJ whose emergence is unrelated to the wrongful act: whether 
there exists a birth, death or marriage is irrelevant to the situation of foreign occupation. 
In contrast, property deprivation as part of policy and practice
118
 is not but furtherance of 
foreign occupation, the illegality of which would be opposable erga omnes.
119
 For this 
reason, the ECtHR should not have relied on the ICJ’s ‘minimalist remarks’ in 
Namibia.
120
 As pointed out, the ECtHR ‘cannot examine the remedies of the “TRNC” in 
a vacuum, as if it were a normal Contracting Party, where it can be assumed that courts 
are “established by law” or that judges are independent and impartial.’121 
It follows from this that the requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies must 
comply with ‘generally recognised rules of international law.’122 Moreover, for a remedy 
to be effective it ‘must never pose a theoretical obstacle to an international solution.’123 In 
this instance, neither the IPC nor Turkey has any legal right on the properties of the 
displaced. Since the occupying power does not obtain sovereignty over occupied territory 
it should not possess legal capacity to decide whether restitution or compensation will be 
granted. Moreover, since the title to the property has not been lost,
124
 any compensation 
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offered does not remove the claim over property restitution. This is because the TRNC 
acts are in breach of international law.
125
  
The IPC provides compensation not for the loss of previous use, but rather, as a way 
of expropriating the affected properties. Section 10 of law 67/2005 illustrates this by 
providing that those who receive compensation or another property can no longer claim a 
right of ownership. Moreover, the IPC is empowered to decide as to restitution, exchange 
of property or compensation.
126
  
The inviolability of property rights during military occupation is well-protected in 
international humanitarian law. Any acquisition of private property against the will and 
consent of the owner violates international law even if there has been ‘payment of a price 
or other adequate consideration.’ This is particularly so when the property owner acts 
under ‘threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position and power of the 
military occupant under circumstances indicating that the owner is being induced to part 
with his property against his will.’127  
Furthermore, article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits confiscation of 
private property. Turkey, as an occupying power bound by the Convention has a duty to 
respect the occupied territory’s laws. Moreover, the occupied territory’s courts shall 
continue to function - which is not applicable in this instance. In cases concerning 
territorial re-adjustments that come as the consequence of armed force, the duty not to 
recognise the wrongdoing remains intact. This entails a duty not to recognise the 
decisions of an unlawful authority, an issue of particular relevance in relation to the IPC, 
and not to recognise territorial changes.
128
 As pointed out, ‘the idea of a general duty to 
deny effect to unlawful acts has been entertained for a long time in the inter-American 
world as a device for the maintenance of international law against the “principle of 
conquest”.’129 According to Tammes, the use of armed force entails a bar on moving 
treaty frontiers whilst any property, rights and interests will not be transferred to the 
wrongdoer.
130
 As a result, neither Turkey nor the IPC can lawfully alter the rights of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), rendering the IPC remedy ineffective. The very most 
that the IPC could perhaps do is to award compensation for the loss of use of property 
and for denial of access. Instead, Turkey’s resolution of property claims by the IPC is 
intended to be permanent. As Judge Koroma pointed out, any activities ‘of a sovereign 
nature which will change their status as occupied territory’ are illegal. According to him, 
‘The essence of occupation is that it is only of a temporary nature and should serve the 
interests of the population and the military needs of the occupying Power.’131 
IPC decisions will have the effect of altering the status of property in occupied 
Cyprus. They will also inevitably have an impact on the right to home, free movement 
and settlement in breach of international humanitarian law. As the ICJ stressed, article 49 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not only prohibit the act of deportation or transfer 
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of population but any measure taken in organizing or encouraging such transfer.
132
 
Article 49 further proceeds to establish an obligation upon an occupying power to allow 
the return of the displaced people to their homes as soon as the hostilities have ended. At 
the same time, article 147 stipulates that unlawful deportation or transfer or extensive 
appropriation of property on discriminatory grounds constitutes a grave breach.
133
   
It is therefore clear that the IPC is not in a position to effectively challenge the 
situation that brought it into force.
134
 The IPC is also unable to authorise the return of the 
displaced. The ECtHR should have therefore prevented Turkey from adopting measures 
intended to alter the legal status of property acquired through force. Giving legal effect 
and validity to such acts is inconsistent with fundamental norms of international law. 
Importantly, ‘the obligations of the state are also unconditional: they do not depend on 
one another, nor are they conditional on an individual complaint. They cannot be 
renounced by victims.’135  
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the IPC, established as a direct 
consequence of unlawful acquisition of territory by force,
136
 does not provide an effective 
remedy.
137
 This is even more so when the wrongful act is continuing as a result of official 
policy and administrative practice, which is considered next.  
 
B. Administrative Practice, Effectiveness and the Immovable Property Commission 
 
According to well established ECtHR jurisprudence, the repetition of the wrongful act as 
part of a policy makes remedies ‘futile’ and is sufficient to relieve individuals from the 
duty to exhaust domestic remedies.
138
 This is because the ECtHR ‘must take realistic 
account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the 
Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which 
they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants.’139 Turkey has 
pursued property deprivation and denial of the right to return home as official policy and 
administrative practice.
140
 Such policy ‘would remain unchanged pending agreement on 
an overall political solution to the Cypriot question.’141 This led the ECtHR to previously 
conclude that the affected individual was relieved from the duty to exhaust domestic 
remedies as they would be unable to challenge it.
142
 This policy ‘must be considered 
continuing’,143 and indeed remains unchanged up to the present day. The persisting heavy 
presence of Turkish troops and the demographic alteration that was achieved as a result 
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of transferring Turkish population to occupied Cyprus are evidence of this. The IPC 
cannot escape from this policy as it is the direct product of it.
144
 Effectively, this is 
equivalent to failure to respond to the serious human rights violations.
145
  
Similarly, the procedure of pilot judgments must provide an opportunity for 
cessation of the violations.
146
 As stressed, ‘it is for the respondent State to remove any 
obstacles in its domestic legal system that might prevent the applicant's situation from 
being adequately redressed’.147 In this instance, neither Turkey nor the IPC has 
implemented a remedy which is capable of addressing the systemic problem, which 
remains one of occupation and ethnic division.  
In conclusion, the ECtHR should have held in Demopoulos that the duty to exhaust 
domestic remedies through the IPC was inoperable due to the pertaining serious 
violations committed by Turkey. Remedies must provide ‘real access to justice’ and 
rectify the violation.
148
 The ability to order cessation and enforcement are essential 
requirements for an effective remedy, qualities not satisfied here.
149
 In the absence of 
these, the ECtHR has no longer a subsidiary role to play. On the contrary, it must ensure 
that affected individuals are protected against remedies which aim to shield state abuses 
rather than to genuinely bring these to an end. Its heavy workload must not compromise 
the fundamental role it has been entrusted with in safeguarding human rights. 
The next section discusses the significance of property restitution and the right to 
return home under international law and how the IPC interferes with such rights. 
 
7. The Right to Property Restitution and to Return Home under International Law 
 
Property is today well protected under customary international law and regional 
instruments such as the ECHR. It also finds protection in national laws, and, indirectly, 
through the principle of non-discrimination, in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
150
 Due to the detrimental effects of displacement, property restitution 
goes to the heart of the right to return. This arguably entails not only the right to return to 
one’s country, but quite significantly, the right to return to one’s home.151  
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To this effect, principle 21 of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(Guiding Principles) protects IDPs against arbitrary deprivation of property and 
possessions.
152
 Significantly, principle 29 stipulates that competent authorities must 
facilitate the return of IDPs and the recovery of their property. Property restoration is also 
safeguarded under principle 2.1 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles).
153
 Under this provision, 
compensation should only be provided if restitution is factually impossible.
154
 Whilst the 
Guiding and the Pinheiro Principles are not legally binding, they constitute authoritative 
instruments particularly to the extent that they reflect existing customary rules.
155
  
Hence, the return of property to its legitimate owners gains particular significance 
as a tool of restoring justice and the rule of law. Importantly, unresolved property issues 
can cause further conflict,
156
 whilst property restitution is a tool for ‘reinstating victims as 
full participants in the social, political and economic life of the community.’157  
Restitution is therefore a principle of primary importance in international law.
158
 
The International Law Commission emphasises this by noting that ‘restitution is the first 
of the forms of reparation available to a State injured by an internationally wrongful act’, 
including the return of property.
159
 Restitution is also imperative in cases of violations of 
peremptory norms of international law such as aggression and acquisition of territory by 
force.
160
 The occupying state is under an obligation to withdraw its forces and to allow 
the return of persons or property.
161
 Significantly, ‘the wrongdoing state may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for the failure to provide full reparation, 
and the mere fact of political or administrative obstacles to restitution does not amount to 
impossibility.’162  
Accordingly, the ECtHR’s conclusion in Demopoulos that a state cannot be 
expected to provide restitution in situations of military occupation is disputed.
163
 Whilst it 
does not recognise the effects of military occupation, it takes ‘a practical approach to an 
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overtly political problem.’164 Further, whilst it rejects that military occupation is a form 
of adverse possession by which a title can be legally transferred, it goes on to add that   
 
it would be unrealistic to expect that … these applicants obtain access to, and 
full possession of, their properties, irrespective of who is now living there or 
whether the property is allegedly in a militarily sensitive zone or used for vital 
public purposes.
165
 
 
Finally, whilst the ECtHR initially recognises that restitution can only be denied in case 
of impossibility, it does not consider whether restitution was impossible in the cases 
before it.
 166
 
Refusal to provide restitution as primary objective would contravene the spirit and 
letter of the ECHR since the protection of dignity through property restitution is at the 
heart of P1-1.
167
 It would also deviate from previous jurisprudence according to which 
compensation alone is not a ‘complete system of redress.’168 As the ECtHR has 
repeatedly held, Turkey is responsible for the continuous total denial of access to and 
control of, use and enjoyment of the property by Greek-Cypriots, in addition to the denial 
of compensation for such interference.
169
  
Restitution is also imperative under international humanitarian law. Population 
transfers constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity if committed 
in a widespread or systematic manner.
170
 The ECtHR should have therefore concluded 
that Turkey had an obligation to provide restitution.
171
   
Importantly, restitution is not conditional upon the rights of third parties since the 
right of the legitimate owner is stronger in international law.
172
 States are not allowed to 
use humanitarian considerations for refusing property restitution to legitimate owners.
173
 
Rather, states have an obligation to take all necessary steps to assist current users by 
providing them with alternative accommodation. As rightly argued by Buyse, an 
approach based on human rights rather than reciprocity ‘offers to each and every one of 
the displaced the possibility to reclaim what was lost.’174 Instead, law 67/2005 makes 
property claims conditional upon the non-existence of other claimants. This would 
include claims from settlers or nationals of other states such as in the case of Orams.
175
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To this effect, the distinction that the ECtHR made between Demopoulos and 
Pincova is not justified.
176
 In the latter case, the ECtHR recognised the initial owner’s 
right to claim back his property which had been unlawfully confiscated by the communist 
regime in 1948. This was despite the fact that the applicants had been living in the house 
as tenants since 1953, and had purchased the property in good faith in 1967. The ECtHR 
held that the restitution laws adopted in 1992 with the purpose of reinstating the rights of 
the property owner pursued a legitimate aim and were ‘means of safeguarding the 
lawfulness of legal transactions.’177 Hence, it was accepted that the restitution given 
effect in this instance aimed at restoring legality.
178
  
Instead, in Demopoulos the emphasis is on not causing ‘injustice’ to third parties, 
whose claim has no foundation in international law.
179
 In doing so, injustice is caused to 
the right-holders. As Allen points out, ‘there is no sensible argument that the revival of 
property rights would amount to an injustice so extreme that a court should disregard 
them.’180 The ECtHR in this instance was reluctant to expressly condemn serious 
injustices caused as part of ethnic cleansing and to protect the right to return home.
181
  
It has been shown that to overlook the right to property restitution and to return 
home in light of practical or political realities is to allow the violator to benefit from their 
wrongdoing.
182
 To this effect, the inability of the IPC to ensure these rights provides an 
additional reason why it does not constitute an effective remedy. 
 
8. Property Restitution, the Immovable Property Commission and the Case of 
Meleagrou 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Turkey has a continuing legal duty to provide 
restitution. The IPC provides therefore only a ‘fictional instrument’ for remedying 
property-related claims.
183
 Its power to order restitution is handicapped by a number of 
conditions that go beyond those provided under P1-1 or general international law. 
Restitution under law 67/2005 does not appear to be a right which can only be 
exceptionally denied. It can be refused on grounds of national security, public order or 
interest, for reasons of social justice or whenever the property concerned is located in a 
military area. On Turkey’s own admission, restitution is also precluded if the property 
concerned was transferred to non-state natural or to legal persons so that a ‘fair balance 
between these conflicting rights’ of the legitimate owner and the occupier would be 
struck.
184
 The IPC aims to resolve property claims ‘without prejudice to the rights of the 
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Turkish Cypriot Community.’185 In those cases where restitution is decided, such 
restitution will not necessarily be given effect until after a final settlement of the Cyprus 
problem. Even in these cases, however, restitution will not be automatic since the current 
holder will have to be granted either compensation or be given alternative 
accommodation as part of the final settlement. Hence, restitution is made conditional 
upon future and uncertain events which render the IPC ineffective.
186
 
According to sources from the TRNC there have been 5754 applications of which 
only 612 have been finalised. 477 applications have been settled through friendly 
settlement. Out of these, only 11 went through formal hearings. In 2 cases the IPC 
decided exchange and compensation, in 1 case restitution, in 5 cases restitution and 
compensation whilst in another case it decided on restitution after the settlement of the 
Cyprus problem.
187
 124 applications have been revoked. Whilst the number of 
applications before the IPC is significant, something that prompted Cyprus to explore 
ways to set up alternative mechanisms to support the displaced and those who wish to 
turn to the IPC,
188
 it still represents a small percentage of the overall displaced population 
of 200,000 who choose not to bring a claim before it. Indeed, more individuals would 
have brought their claims before the IPC, had it been a genuinely effective remedy.  
It becomes evident from the above figures that restitution is a rare exception. 
Even in cases where restitution has been decided, there still has not been restitution in 
practice. Buyse makes a significant point in this regard: restitution recognised by law or 
through judicial decisions but ‘without the practical possibility to dispose of the property 
concerned does not end a situation of interference with property rights, but prolongs 
it.’189   
The extent of the IPC’s ineffectiveness and the detrimental impact of Demopoulos 
are revealed in the case of Meleagrou. Meleagrou concerned three separate applications 
brought directly before the IPC 4 years before Demopoulos for the restitution of, and 
compensation for loss of use and non-pecuniary damage of 18 plots of land. After three 
hearings in November 2008, January and May 2009 the IPC rejected all the claims in 
October 2009.  
The IPC relied on various grounds. First, it refused to recognise one of the 
applicant’s ownership for 14 plots on the ground that according to TRNC 1974 land 
registry records these were not registered in her name in 1974, nor was she the legal heir 
of the 1974 owner as required under law 67/2005.
190
 This was despite the fact that these 
were transferred, according to Cyprus Land Registry records, lawfully by the company to 
which they were registered in 1974 to the applicant’s husband and eventually to her in 
2001. It is noteworthy that the ownership was never disputed during negotiations but only 
after the applicant’s insistence on restitution.191  
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Secondly, it denied restitution where land was allocated to a dispossessed owner, 
reserved for military purposes or constituted a coastal line. This was despite the fact that 
one of the plots with one of the applicants’ home was found to be registered in a Turkish 
settler’s name,192 whilst a part of another had been leased to Sunzest Trading Ltd, a 
company owned by Asil Nadir.
193
 Significantly, the IPC refused to award compensation 
for loss of use and non-pecuniary damage since the applicants failed to claim 
compensation for effectively the expropriation of land or exchange according to article 8 
of Law 67/2005.
194
 The IPC also refused to award compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage for fields.
195
  
The IPC did however allow restitution of part of one plot since it had never been 
used as a forest as it was declared,
196
 although this is still to materialise.
197
  
After exhausting all available remedies, the applicants resorted to the ECtHR which 
declared their applications inadmissible. The ECtHR refused to accept, as it had 
previously done,
198
 the company’s ownership transfer for the 14 plots.199 This was despite 
the fact that the transfer was carried out lawfully by internationally recognised authorities 
and it is to be contrasted with the ECtHR’s willingness to recognise TRNC deeds as valid 
on the basis of Namibia.  
The ECtHR also concluded that whilst the applicants did resort to the IPC they 
failed to make ‘proper use’ of available remedies. By only requesting restitution they 
failed to request exchange of property or pecuniary compensation for the land, which 
would also have included compensation for loss of use and non-pecuniary damage. As 
stressed, ‘The fact that the applicants did not want to claim redress which would have led 
to them giving up their claim of title to the land is not relevant to this assessment. It was 
their choice, but it excluded them from obtaining the other available remedies.’200 In this 
regard, the ECtHR disregarded that compensation ‘cures and rewards’ ethnic cleansing 
by removing ownership.
201
  
The impact of Demopoulos is clear with an arbitrary expansion of the 
circumstances under which restitution can be refused.
202
 Furthermore, the ECtHR failed 
to consider in any substantive matter whether the remedy concerned was effective as 
applied in the facts of Meleagrou. This is further evident from recent revelations that the 
area regarded by the IPC and the ECtHR as a military zone (Pente Mili) is reported to 
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have been rented to a Turkish company to carry out hotel investments.
203
 Moreover, the 
ECtHR refused to consider compensation for non-pecuniary damages for uninhabited 
land.
204
  
Whilst Meleagrou raises a number of significant legal issues worthy of separate 
consideration, it becomes clear that it effectively erodes states’ obligations towards 
restitution, particularly in this context. Even more so, it upholds the occupying power’s 
position to punish the applicants for not accepting expropriation of their land contrary to 
previous case law according to which restitution was a pre-condition for the effectiveness 
of any remedy.
205
 
That the IPC has no intention of terminating the violations is further evident by 
the testimony of those who take claims before it, although verifying facts remains 
difficult. This is because Cyprus still refuses to recognise the IPC,
206
 and as a 
consequence it possesses no information on the number or outcome of applications before 
the IPC, whilst applicants refuse to openly discuss their cases.  
Nevertheless, information obtained reveals the existing difficulties in receiving 
effective therapy by the IPC which only compensates for land expropriation.
207
 
Moreover, the procedure before the IPC is described as ‘pointless’ and ‘prohibitive’ and 
subject to a number of unjustified delays.
208
 Whilst the applications of Meleagrou were 
the first to go to a hearing,
209
 it took 5 years before reaching a decision. Furthermore, 
whilst the IPC is required to give an opinion within 30 days from receiving an application 
it takes two years to do so as it appears to be under-staffed. For instance, the opinion for a 
claim submitted on 10 August 2011 was issued on 19 September 2013. One also needs to 
look at the data available to see the number of cases adjourned ‘sine die’.210 Even if cases 
are settled it may take months before the IPC signs the deal and even longer before the 
applicant is actually compensated.
211
 
From further research
212
 it also became clear that applicants fall into two 
categories: those who want to sell their property for mainly financial reasons and those 
who aim to re-possess their property and obtain compensation for loss of use plus interest 
since 1974. The first category represents the majority of applicants who are in financial 
hardship. This comes as no surprise under the current financial climate in Cyprus. These 
applicants are desperate and keen to accept any compensation without going to a hearing. 
The compensation is calculated on the devaluation of property in the occupied areas 
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which appears to be at variance with ECtHR awards made in similar cases.
213
 Applicants 
feel frustrated by the low compensation they receive. In many cases where the offer is too 
low, they prefer to withdraw their claim without prejudice rather than have to wait 5-7 
years for the completion of the IPC process before going to the ECtHR.  
Those applicants who insist on restitution are a minority and their claims are 
additionally faced with repeated non-substantive demands thereby exercising pressure to 
settle. The low number of cases that reached hearing proceedings (11)
214
  confirms a 
trend on the IPC’s part, which is involved in the negotiations, to avoid such hearings and 
to settle. This is further evidenced by the fact that hearings are only possible in the 
presence of the two foreign IPC members which take place for about a week, 3-4 times a 
year.  
Moreover, the procedure before the IPC is lengthy owed to practical difficulties to 
handle the number of claims and to prepare valuations, as well as to an apparent lack of 
motivation to speed up the procedures particularly ‘after it secured Demopoulos’.   
Problems also arise relating to property situated in the enclosure of Famagusta – a 
key area in the ongoing negotiations - as the authorities employ some ‘dirty tricks’. If an 
applicant files a claim for different properties one of which is in the fenced city, the 
authorities exercise pressure upon them, through non-filing of their opposition, to drop 
their claim regarding such property in order to consider their claims for property 
elsewhere.  
Difficulties also exist relating to stricter demands for presentation of documents to 
establish ownership, such as the identity card of people who may have been dead for 
decades, or issues relating to accurate document translation.  
Another significant problem arises with properties burdened with a mortgage. 
Whilst after the invasion banks in the free areas proceeded to cancel mortgages relating to 
properties in the occupied areas, the TRNC Land Registry Office does not have these 
updated records. This prevents the hearing of such claims.  
As is clear from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s example, under-staffing, slow 
procedures and the imposition of difficult to overcome hurdles are indicative of the low 
interest in providing effective human rights protection.
215
 It therefore becomes clear that 
Demopoulos not only offers little incentive for the restoration of rights of the displaced in 
Cyprus, but it is also used to formalize human rights abuses. Accordingly, a political 
solution in Cyprus is hardly likely to restore the human rights of the displaced. Turkey 
has no genuine intention to reverse the status quo. To the contrary, it aims to retain 
control through ethnic division materialised through complete denial of restitution. 
Furthermore, Turkey still refuses to pay the compensation awarded by the ECtHR in the 
cases preceding Demopoulos.
216
 These issues, combined with the analysis in the next 
section, explain why the Cyprus dispute is to be contrasted with other cases whereby 
peace was achieved without extensive restitution programmes. 
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9. Peace without Restitution?  
 
Property restitution remains controversial in international law. In addition to the financial 
hurdles and the practical complexities that restitution involves,
217
 not everyone agrees on 
its desirability either as a tool for economic growth or restoration of the rule of law.
218
 
For instance, some argue that property restitution is not as important in light of other 
serious human rights violations which may have occurred under oppressive regimes.
219
  
Following the territorial adjustments and population movements that occurred in 
Europe as a result of WWII, millions of individuals lost their properties and were forced 
to relocate. The problem re-surfaced with the collapse of communism when affected 
states were faced with the challenge of protecting their sovereign identity as well as 
dealing with past expropriations.  
Experience however on how post-communist states dealt with restitution widely 
varies. It is noteworthy that no state restored property to every dispossessed.
220
 In the 
Czech Republic for instance restitution was exempted for expropriation that took place 
pre-1948 or for property that belonged to Sudeten Germans.
221
 This reflected the view, 
arguably questionable, that expropriations against those perceived to have been Nazi 
collaborators, were justified as collective punishment.
222
 Similarly in Poland restitution of 
property which belonged to displaced Germans was denied through national 
legislation.
223
 In Hungary, instead of restitution the state agreed to pay fixed rates in the 
form of coupons. Only properties with small market value were returned.
224
 In Germany 
too expropriations during the Soviet control were exempted from restitution.
225
 
Despite these considerations, states did try to implement, to a lesser or greater 
extent, restitution policies. Although restitution remains in many countries an open 
wound as evident from cases that reached the ECtHR,
226
 this has not prevented them 
from achieving peace. It is nevertheless necessary to understand the legal framework in 
existence at the time of this dispossession, when human rights and the contemporary rules 
on armed force had just started to find express recognition in international conventional 
as well as customary law. Even though such rights are now widely recognised, problems 
remain relating to the non-retroactive character of treaties such as the ECHR, which make 
restitution of pre-ratification expropriation difficult to achieve.
227
 Furthermore, such 
dispossession through population transfers and territorial adjustments was given effect 
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through peace treaties to mark the end of the war, such as the 1945 Potsdam 
Agreement.
228
  
For these reasons, these examples need to be differentiated from the Cypriot cases 
which concern dispossession in continuing violation of post-WWII international norms, 
including the ECHR rights, and which took effect after the latter’s ratification. Moreover, 
unlike the post-communism cases in which the ECtHR cast doubt as to which state was 
responsible for such expropriations,
229
 Turkey bears sole responsibility for these 
violations. The ECtHR itself, drawing a line between these two sets of cases stressed that  
 
in the Loizidou case the inherent illegitimacy of measures stripping the 
applicant of her ownership rights derived from the fact that the 
expropriation laws in question could not be attributed legal validity for the 
purposes of the Convention as they emanated from an entity which was 
not recognised in international law as a State and whose annexation and 
administration of the territory concerned had no basis in international law. 
As a result, it could not be said that formal acts of expropriation were 
carried out.
230
 
 
The case for restitution in a post-WWII context however becomes even more compelling 
in situations where displacement occurs on the basis of discriminatory laws.
231
 Such laws, 
implemented in former Yugoslavia were regarded as an impediment to ‘reconstruction 
and reconciliation.’232 Hence, ‘Return was … explicitly connected to peace’.233  
Similarly, in South Africa restitution was an integral part of the political solution and 
reconciliation.
234
 Importantly, even if a potential future political settlement may include 
restitution this should not be used to deny restitution in cases before the ECtHR before 
such settlement has been agreed upon. Nor should a political solution concretize practices 
of ethnic cleansing given effect through denial of restitution.  
In this light, the next session focuses on another aspect of the IPC which renders it 
ineffective, namely that of discrimination. It is argued in this regard that the ECtHR’ s 
insistence on a political, as opposed to a legal, solution is problematic. 
 
10. Non-Discrimination and the Immovable Property Commission 
 
The IPC bases its decisions on bi-zonality and bi-communality. The ultimate purpose of 
these is to make territorial readjustments and prevent free settlement and return on the 
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basis of discriminatory, ethnic, racial and religious grounds.
235
 Such policies violate both 
the ECHR and international humanitarian law as ethnic cleansing.
236
 Although the 
ECtHR in Demopoulos seems to recognise that there exists a ‘general policy to exclude 
Greek-Cypriots from their homes and properties’ which did not rely ‘on any objective 
and reasonable justification’,237 it did not examine the question of discrimination. It relied 
instead on its previous jurisprudence on the dispute in which no determination on 
discrimination was made.
238
 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that in those cases 
the ECtHR found violations of other fundamental rights, and this is why it did not 
consider it necessary to address the question of discrimination under article 14.
239
 In 
Demopoulos, however, such examination was necessary not only in relation to whether a 
violation of article 14 existed, but also in relation to the effectiveness of the IPC as a 
remedy. The commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity through 
displacement and ethnic cleansing and racial division make such consideration necessary.  
Whilst article 14 is read in conjunction with another Convention article, it can still 
be examined on its own even if the ECtHR has not found any other violation. In this 
instance, the ECtHR should have taken into consideration the discriminatory elements in 
the procedure before the IPC to determine that there was a breach of article 14 and that as 
a result the remedy was ineffective.
240
 
Any interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions must also be 
proportionate and satisfy a legitimate aim.
241
 On the one hand, proportionality is linked 
with the affected person’s dignity. Refusal to return the property concerned causes a 
disproportionate harm.
242
 On the other hand, the occupation of territory, forcible 
expulsion of civilians and dispossession on the basis of discrimination does not serve any 
legitimate aims. As stressed in Dokic it was ‘a matter of principle’ that such ethnic 
differentiation could not be ‘objectively justified in a contemporary democratic 
society.’243   
Whilst states enjoy some discretion in restricting the right to property, such 
discretion is not unfettered. The adoption of law 67/2005 does not by itself mean that 
Turkey has satisfied its duty to provide an effective remedy. This is because law must 
satisfy justice. According to Radbruch, such justice is fulfilled if it adheres to equality. In 
other words, laws that discriminate are not just.
244
 
The ECtHR has a pivotal role to play in transitional cases. By providing an effective 
remedy to undo past injustices it ensures not only that practices in breach of fundamental 
rights cease, but also, importantly, that they are not repeated in the future. Preventing the 
displaced to return home and to reclaim their property has been used as a tool for 
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territorial advances and discriminatory restrictions. The ECtHR, as Europe’s principal 
human rights monitoring body, should ensure that such practices are no longer tolerated. 
Importantly, ECtHR decisions should comply with well established principles relating to 
the rights of the dispossessed.  
 
11. Conclusion 
 
Displacement due to armed conflict or foreign occupation is not a new phenomenon in 
international law. The deportation and transfer of large parts of population from one area 
to another has often been used as a tool of territorial acquisition or ethnic cleansing. 
However, displacement can no longer be ignored due to the grave consequences it brings 
to the affected people and its severe interference with fundamental rights. Hence, 
property restitution and the return of the displaced gain particular significance in 
restoring the rule of law and providing justice to the victims of past injustice. 
This article has argued that the political nature of a dispute or the passage of time 
are not sufficient to erase the internationally protected rights of the displaced. This article 
has also argued that international bodies such as the ECtHR need to ensure that remedies 
set up unlawfully to shield and further human rights violations must not be accepted. 
Such remedies must be clearly distinguished from those whose purpose is to facilitate the 
daily routine of the affected population. The IPC is the product of unlawful use of armed 
force. Rather than ensuring cessation of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and remedying 
the displacement of Greek-Cypriots, it aims to interfere in a permanent manner with the 
rights of the displaced and to legitimize the status quo. As such, it should not have been 
accepted by the ECtHR in Demopoulos as an effective remedy. Allowing the victim to 
have access to an impartial and independent court of law is of primary importance.
245
 The 
ECtHR should therefore be able to accept as admissible individual complaints unless and 
in so far as ‘domestic decision-makers have resumed their rightful position as the 
Convention’s first-line defenders.’246 The ECtHR’s approach to distance the question of 
effectiveness of a remedy from its validity in international law is in the author’s view 
problematic. 
Furthermore, the existing hurdles on restitution must be lifted in order to enable the 
reinstatement of the international legal order.
247
 According to the UNHCR, there cannot 
be ‘sustainable peace and stability …. Against the background of unfulfilled desires for 
return; they will remain destabilising factors for generations to come…’.248 
There is indeed nothing ‘maximalistic’249 in the idea of working for a settlement of 
the Cyprus problem that is founded on human rights and democratic principles and is free 
from discrimination. Where political and factual realities come into play, the rule of law 
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must prevail. Turkey remains responsible for depriving displaced persons of their right to 
enjoy their property without any interference. It also retains full responsibility for 
preventing them from returning home, imposing discriminatory division in violation of 
international law.  
The preceding analysis has shown that there exists a concrete system of protection 
of the displaced developed under both international humanitarian and human rights law. 
This system prohibits practices of ethnic cleansing and displacement. At the same time, it 
provides for the return of the displaced and the restitution of their property rights. The 
ECtHR in Demopoulos should have taken these factors into consideration in determining 
the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the IPC. Whilst restitution is provided under 
law 67/2005, there is no restitution in practice or as a matter of a general rule as evident 
from post-Demopoulos developments.  
The decision of the ECtHR has serious legal ramifications on the rights to property 
restitution and to return home in cases of foreign occupation and it appears to be at 
variance with well established rules of international law.
250
 Whilst appreciating the 
factors that underlay the ECtHR’s reasoning, Demopoulos stands in the way of effective 
protection of the rights of IDPs in Cyprus and elsewhere and of restoration of legality. 
This is evident from subsequent cases that reached the ECtHR such as in Meleagrou. The 
ECtHR needs to take remedial action to fill the human-rights vacuum its decision in 
Demopoulos has left. The ECtHR is now called to demonstrate that it is indeed ‘the 
world’s most effective international human rights tribunal’,251 and that it substantially 
safeguards civil and political rights as it was mandated to do. In this regard, providing 
victims of serious wrongdoings with an impartial and effective forum in which to be 
heard and ensuring that corrective justice is done is the only way forward for respect of 
the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. 
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